brink.
continuous adversarial security

We break in
so they don't.

Quarterly pentests are stale within a week. Brink runs autonomous attackers against your app 24/7 — IDOR, auth bypass, SSRF, the things real hackers actually use.

brink-agent · recon-04 · acme.dev
live · attacking
scope · api.acme.dev/v1/* · readonly verbs only0/22 events
REAL ATTACK · REPLAYED
how we get in

Three things, on a loop.

A pentest is a snapshot. Brink is a movie that doesn't end — agents wake up, probe, write findings, sleep, repeat.

01step

You point us at staging.

A URL, an OpenAPI spec or HAR file, and a list of synthetic accounts. No agents in your code, no GitHub app, no SOC2-scope surface to argue about.

$ brink scope add api.acme.dev --auth=jwt --accounts=4
02step

We attack like real attackers.

Agents enumerate auth, map routes, hypothesize weaknesses, and exploit them. We chain primitives — an info leak feeds an IDOR feeds an account takeover.

→ 1,841 requests · 19 hypotheses · 3 confirmed exploits
03step

You get the proof and the fix.

Confirmed findings hit your inbox with a reproducible curl, captured session, suggested patch, and an open PR against the offending repo. Coverage is logged — even what we tried and failed.

WRITE finding BRK-2417 · OPEN pull/2241
attack surface

The things real hackers actually use.

Brink doesn't ship a list of CVEs. It ships the bugs that get apps owned in 2026 — the ones your scanner finds zero of.

// 813 confirmed exploits across 47 customer tenants in the last 90 days.
// approx. 0.4 false-positives per 100 confirmed findings.

IDOR / BOLA
tenant-bleed via path & query params
● 412 confirmed / 90d
Auth bypass
missing checks on internal routes, JWT abuse
● 94
SSRF
webhook validators, image proxies, oembed
● 73
Race conditions
double-spend, coupon stacking, TOCTOU
● 61
Stored XSS chains
user content → admin viewport → token theft
● 48
Business logic
refund loops, escalation via API verbs
● 57
Secret exfil
API keys, MFA seeds, signing material
● 39
Token & session
JWT replay, refresh-token reuse, idle bypass
● 29
14m
median time-to-first-finding
after staging is connected
0.4%
false-positive rate
per confirmed exploit
24/7
agent uptime
since you fell asleep
$0
until we get in
pay per confirmed exploit
findings inbox

One inbox. Real exploits only.

Every alert is reproducible, owned, and labeled with a fix. No CVE lists, no severity inflation, no `medium` that nobody reads.

inbox · 14 unread · acme.devnow → 90d
criticalBRK-2417IDOR + api-key exfil on /v1/users/{id}14m
highBRK-2416Stored XSS in markdown renderer → admin viewport2h
highBRK-2415JWT replay across tenants (kid rotation gap)6h
mediumBRK-2414SSRF via webhook validator → metadata svc11h
infoBRK-2413Timing oracle on /reset-password (weak)1d

Your last pentest was 11 weeks ago. We've found 3 new paths since.

Connect staging in 4 minutes. First confirmed exploit in your inbox inside 24 hours or you owe us nothing.